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ABSTRACT. We investigate implications for the cost of capital in a model with 
agency conflicts between inside and outside shareholders, where the severity of 
agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor protection. Using firm-
level data for Italy and Germany we find significant differences in shareholder 
protection and its implications for the firm’s ownership structure and the cost of 
capital. Results indicate that concentrated inside ownership increases the cost of 
capital for Italian firms while having no significant impact on the cost of capital for 
German firms. Evidence also suggests bank influence in Germany may serve to 
reduce investor risk for outside shareholders. In contrast, the magnitude of capital 
stock distortions is found to be quite important in Italy. Overall, slow growth in 
continental Europe may be more closely linked to institutional differences in 
shareholder protection between countries rather than inside ownership of firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
here is mounting empirical evidence, 
including Pagano, Panetta and Zingales 
(1998) and Carpenter and Rondi 
(2006), that EU firms continued to exhibit 
slow rates of capital formation in the 1990s 
despite various policy initiatives to bolster 
equity markets and improve legal 
harmonization.1  An alternative approach for 
explaining the differing growth rates between 
the US and Europe is to examine how the 
institutional differences between countries 
impact the firm’s cost of capital.  In this paper 
we set out to empirically investigate the 
impact of investor protection on the cost of 
capital in Europe, where investor protection 
can be characterized “those features of the 
legal, institutional, and regulatory 
environment – and characteristics of firms or 
projects - that facilitate financial contracting 
between inside owners (managers) and 
outside investors”, Himmelberg, Hubbard, 
and Love (HHL) (2002). To date, research 
indicates the significance of these effects 
overall and the importance of examining dif-
ferences between countries, but few empirical 
studies have emerged to link firm financial 
behavior to the institutional environment.  
Several recent studies have pointed to the 
potential importance of differences in the 
financial contracting environment and the way 
legal systems protect investors to help explain 
differential growth rates between the US and 
Europe (see, for example, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998, and Levine, 1999). La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(“LLSV”, 1998, 2000), have shown that 
investor protection can be important in 
explaining why firms are owned and financed 
differently between countries. Cross-country 
evidence also shows that firms in countries 
with weak investor protection, such as many 
EU member states, have highly concentrated 
ownership (LLSV, 1999, Barca and Becht, 
2001, and Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung for a 
                                                                    
1  A large body of recent empirical literature has 
examined the impact of financing constraints on 
firms’ fixed capital investment decision (see 
Hubbard, 1998, for a survey). 
recent survey). HHL (2002) expanded this 
work by deriving a structural econometric 
model in which the effects of the legal system 
are summarized to investigate the relationship 
among investor protection, inside ownership 
concentration, and the cost of capital using 
pooled data for 38 countries. They find that on 
the average, the higher the level of inside 
ownership, the higher is the marginal cost of 
capital – due to the higher risk premium. This 
model is important because it provides a 
framework to explain the role of weak 
governance in the efficient accumulation of 
capital, such as that experienced in the 1990s 
in Europe. 
Our study extends the literature in two 
important ways: 1) by providing a micro 
examination of firm level behavior and 
agency related problems in the 1990s in 
Germany and Italy; and 2) allowing a more 
detailed comparison of two allegedly similar 
“poor shareholder protection” countries, 
which in fact have two very different legal, 
institutional, and regulatory environments. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 
1 details the theoretical framework and 
predictions of our model. Section 2 briefly 
describes the institutional context in Germany 
and Italy, and the data. Section 3 describes the 
empirical strategy and results. We conclude in 
Section 4 by discussing implications for 
policy makers concerned with addressing firm 
growth and financing issues within the 
European context.    
1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical foundation of this study is 
based on the agency theory of the firm as 
outlined in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), where agency 
problems between insiders and outsiders can 
arise because insiders can divert firm profits 
to themselves before paying out dividends.  
There is also a relevant treatment of these 
issues in the legal literature where different 
legal institutions reportedly have systematic 
influences on investor protection (LLSV, 
2000, Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002).  More 
recently, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love 
T 
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(2002) develop a model incorporating both the 
legal and financial strands of literature. The 
model introduces insider risk aversion as the 
offsetting cost of insider ownership.  
Specifically, poor investor protection (or more 
pointedly, poor protection of minority share-
holders) favors insiders (controlling share-
holders who control the decision-making of 
the firm) because it allows them to expro-
priate outside (minority) shareholders.  Con-
centrated ownership is thus viewed as the 
response to, or the substitute for, the lack of 
legal protection, reducing agency problems 
and managerial slack (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), or minority 
investors’ expropriation - under the assum-
ption that the dominant shareholder does not 
steal from oneself.2 
Our focus is on the growth of the firms and 
underinvestment.  We argue that the 
consequences of lack of investor protection 
for firm growth need to be spelled out. Weak 
(minority) investor protection and 
concentrated ownership may be detrimental 
not only to the insider but also to the firm in 
that by preventing the insider (as shareholder) 
from diversifying risk optimally they also 
prevent the insider (as shareholder-manager) 
from pursuing growth-oriented, risky capital 
projects, thus impeding optimal capital 
accumulation for the firm.   
According to HHL (2002), under imperfect 
investor protection, the entrepreneur/manager 
must retain an equity stake in the firm large 
enough to reassure minority shareholders that 
he will neither pursue value-destroying 
projects nor carry out expropriation. The 
insider will thus be forced to bear high levels 
of idiosyncratic risk for having a large bulk of 
his wealth invested in (tied to) the firm. By 
reflection, the insider will raise external funds 
                                                                    
2  Interestingly, reliance on this “second-best” 
solution to agency frictions may be the reason why, 
in many industrialized countries, company by-laws 
still include relatively few rules aimed at protecting 
minority shareholders. Although some progress has 
been achieved within the EU, as part of the legal 
harmonization program, much is yet to be done. For 
example, recent financial scandals in Italy (e.g. 
Parmalat and Cirio) have been interpreted as a 
consequence of the delay in the harmonization (see 
The Economist, January 3rd, 2004). 
(equity) in a proportion to the initial wealth 
invested in the firm that does not dilute his 
incentives, regardless of the actual amount of 
equity finance that would be needed to fund 
the firm’s growth project.  
Two consequences result from this agency 
problem.  First there should be an additional 
premium in the cost of capital that reflects the 
additional idiosyncratic risk that the 
entrepreneur/manager is forced to bear, thus 
reducing in equilibrium the desired stock of 
capital. And second, a suboptimal quantity of 
capital is raised on the equity market (at the 
time of the IPO, and subsequently).  While we 
do not attempt to test for the second result, we 
note that debt to equity ratios in Germany and 
Italy are broadly quoted as 1:1 vs. 1:4 for the 
US. The first consequence is one that we shall 
empirically examine in this study. 
1.1 Inside Ownership, Stealing, and the Cost 
of Capital  
Our model directly follows that outlined in 
HHL (2002), which we employ as follows. 
The model describes a firm where managers 
are in full control of the decision-making, and 
have access to a growth project. We assume 
that the firm has a Cobb Douglas production 
function, described by Π(K), where K is the 
capital stock that depreciates at the rate δ. The 
managers are risk averse and seek to diversify 
by selling a fraction 1- α, of the equity in the 
firm. Insiders can steal or divert a fraction sit+1 
of firm profits to themselves before paying 
dividends, but stealing has a cost, as defined 
by an exogenous punishment technology, 
which is a positive function of a quantitative 
index of investor protection, φit3: 
 
c(φit, sit) = ½ φitsit2   [1] 
 
The manager’s net return Nit+1 in period 
t+1, after taking the firm public, is:  
 
Nit+1 = [αit(1 - sit+1 ) + sit+1 - c(φit, sit+1)] 
Π(K it+1,θ it+1)                                 [2] 
                                                                    
3  Higher values of the parameter φit indicate better 
protection. 
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Because of agency problems between 
insiders and outsiders, when managers raise 
external finance they have to convince outside 
investors that they will receive a fair market 
rate of return (i.e. that stealing will not 
occur).4  With imperfect investor protection, 
the managers have to commit to lower levels 
of future stealing by retaining a higher 
fraction of equity than would be optimal for 
them to fully diversify the firm-specific risk. 
Consequently, they are forced to bear high 
levels of diversifiable idiosyncratic risk. The 
tradeoff between risk and insiders’ incentive 
to invest in risky capital projects determines 
the inside ownership stake in equilibrium. The 
empirical implications derive from the first-
order condition that characterizes the optimal 
capital choice:  
 
E [Π’(k)] = r + δ + Γ + α(γ – Γ) [3] 
 
E [Π’(k)] is the marginal profit of capital 
and the right hand side represents the firm’s 
user cost of capital, where r is the risk-free 
rate and δ is the depreciation rate on capital. Γ 
and (γ – Γ) represent the risk discounts in the 
cost of capital for (non-diversifiable) 
systematic risk and (diversifiable) 
idiosyncratic risk, which depend in turn on the 
stochastic discount factors of the market and 
of the manager, respectively. What is of 
interest here is that the idiosyncratic compo-
nent exists because a large fraction of the 
insider’s income is derived from the profita-
bility of the firm. With poor investor protec-
tion, and α>0, there is an additional premium 
in the cost of capital, namely, α(γ – Γ) > 0.  
The economic intuition of the model is that 
insiders assign a lower value to risky projects 
(and profits) than outside investors. Assuming 
(r + δ + Γ) constant, one can estimate (γ – Γ) 
by regressing E [Π’(k)], or marginal profit of 
capital, on inside ownership.  
                                                                    
 
4  The level of stealing that maximizes the 
managers’ net return (∂Nit+1 / ∂sit+1) is characterized 
by the first-order condition cs(φit, sit+1) + αit = 1.  The 
optimal stealing is therefore: sit+1 = (1-αit)/φit which 
indicates that stealing is increasing in outside 
ownership, decreasing in investor protection, and also 
that inside ownership is inversely related to investor 
protection. 
1.2 Measuring the Marginal Profit of Capital 
The marginal profit of capital can be 
measured as follows.5 Suppose the firm has a 
Cobb-Douglas production function Yit = 
f(Ait;Kit;Zit) = AKαkZαz, where Ait is a measure 
of total factor productivity, Yit is output, Kit 
represents the stock fixed capital including the 
firm’s property, plant and equipment, and Zit 
is a vector of variable factor inputs (e.g., 
materials, energy, unskilled production 
workers).  Now assuming that the firm faces 
an inverse demand curve P(Yit), variable 
factor prices wit, and fixed costs F, then the 
profit function is defined by  
 
Π(Kit;wit) = max P(Yit)Yit –wit Zit – F [4] 
      s.t. Yit = AKαkZαz 
 
Then by the envelope theorem, the 
marginal profitability of fixed capital, denoted 
MPK, is: 
 
MPK ≡ ∂Πit/∂Kit =  (1+ η-1) Pit (∂fit/∂Kit)  
=(1+ η-1) αk (S/K) = θ (S/K)  [5] 
 
Where η ≡ (∂Y/∂P)P/Y <-1 is the firm-level 
price elasticity of demand , αk is the capital 
share of output, S=PY is the firm’s sales, and 
θ = (1+η-1)αk is a scale parameter that may 
vary across industries because price elasticity 
of demand as well as the capital share of sales 
are different across industries. Thus, up to an 
industry-specific scale parameter, the ratio of 
sales to capital may be used to measure the 
marginal profitability of fixed capital. 
Assuming that firms are on average at their 
equilibrium capital stocks, the marginal 
profitability of capital should roughly equal 
the cost of capital, MPKit = rit + δit, where rit 
is the risk-adjusted discount rate and δit is the 
depreciation rate.  
1.3 Predictions 
In countries where investor protection is said 
to be generally low, the model predicts 
                                                                    
5  See Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) for 
detailed derivation and empirical estimates for US 
firms.   
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endogenously high levels of insider 
ownership. Accordingly, the idiosyncratic risk 
premium applied to the cost of capital should 
be high, implying a steady-state level of 
capital below the first-best level. This allows 
us to measure the real effects of corporate 
governance, namely that of the effects on the 
accumulation of capital of the firm. 
Specifically, we estimate the determinants of 
the fraction of equity owned by insiders, 
testing as predicted, whether this fraction 
depends on measures of investor protection. 
We depart from previous studies in that our 
empirical approach emphasizes the cross-firm 
dimension of investor protection by adding 
firm-level proxies of investor protections. 
Thus, we test the prediction that investor 
protection has an important cross-firm and 
cross-cultural dimension by using data for 
Germany and Italy separately. We then 
investigate the correlation between inside 
equity ownership and the marginal return to 
capital, a relationship that follows directly 
from the first-order condition for capital, 
where the cost of capital includes a risk 
premium that reflects the insiders’ exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk. 
To estimate these relationships we use two 
separate data sets tracking the behavior of 
Italian and German firms listed on the Borsa 
Italiana and the Frankfurt Exchange, 
respectively. In addition to using the financial 
data from annual reports of these firms, our 
study also employs detailed information on 
each firm’s corporate ownership structure, 
including that on the identity and 
concentration of ownership.  
2. GERMAN AND ITALIAN 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
AND DATA 
2.1 German and Italian Institutional 
Frameworks 
In the economics literature Germany and Italy 
are often grouped together for analysis as 
countries where investors are weakly 
protected.  We find this treatment is too 
generalized, particularly when one considers 
the fact that although they share the Romano-
Germanic civil law tradition, their respective 
institutional environments have developed 
rather differently. Germany derives its laws 
from the German Commercial Code written in 
1897 after Bismarck’s unification of 
Germany, while Italy’s company laws 
originates from the French Commercial Code, 
written under Napoleon in 1807. LLSV 
(1998) which provides a comprehensive and 
detailed overview of many of the differences 
between legal, institutional, and regulatory 
frameworks across countries, concurs with our 
view by finding evidence of statistically 
significant differences between the institutions 
in countries following in the Germanic 
tradition (Germany) versus the French civil 
code tradition (Italy).  We have summarized 
key findings below from a recent World Bank 
report appropriately named Removing 
Obstacles to Growth.  
This World Bank data supports the well 
known stylized fact that both Germany and 
Italy have high ownership concentration 
levels compared to the US, as well as similar 
(lower) levels of informational disclosure 
requirements -however many other factors 
impacting investor protection in Italy are quite 
different than Germany.6   
Specifically, German shareholders scored 8 
out of 10 points for having laws relating to 
creditor/borrower rights in bankruptcy, and 
had an 8% of costs of insolvency –both scores 
very similar to the US.  Whereas Italy’s cost 
of insolvency is more than double Germany’s, 
scoring a weak 3 for legal rights on 
borrower/lender protection.  Further, costs of 
collateral are an order of magnitude higher in 
Italy than the US or Germany. Observations 
such as these are part of the reason that some 
legal scholars, including Theodore Baums 
(2004), feel that Germany is toughening up in 
terms of guidelines on governance and it is 
rapidly moving closer to a UK/US model. 
 
 
                                                                    
 
6  Figure 1 includes data for the US for purposes 
of providing a comparative benchmark for European 
firm performance. 
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Figure 1. Summary Comparison of Investor Protection Characteristics 
Country Ownership Concentration 
Information 
Disclosure 
Legal  
Rights 
Collateral 
Costs 
Insolvency 
Costs 
Italy 0.58 5 3 3.7 18 
Germany 0.48 5 8 0.0   8 
US 0.20 7 7 0.2   8 
Disclosure index out of 10, based on investor protection laws and regulations requiring reporting (World Bank 2005) 
Legal rights index out of 10, based on laws protecting borrowers and lenders (World Bank 2005) 
Costs to create collateral as a % income per capita (World Bank 2005) 
Costs of insolvency as a % of estate (World Bank 2005) 
 
 
Summing up, while the German law may 
exhibit relatively poor shareholder’s 
protection compared to the US or UK for 
example, it does have high protection of 
creditors’ rights and law enforcement 
compared to Italy.  Italy’s law extends weak 
protection both to shareholders and creditors, 
as well as medium to low enforcement of law. 
Prior to the European Monetary Union, 
several institutional features changed in Italy, 
such as: liberalization of the financial mar-
kets, privatization of many banks and public 
utilities, and introduction of a new corporate 
law that regulates take-over bids, enforces 
more informative accounting standards and 
disclosure requirements for listed companies. 
In 1997, the MSE – Milan Stock Exchange 
market was privatized, resulting in less re-
strictive and less costly listing requirements; 
in 1999, the Nuovo Mercato, the Italian coun-
terpart of NASDAQ was launched for high 
tech firms –the same year as the Neuer Markt; 
and a Corporate Governance Code of Self-
discipline was issued7, but only enforced on a 
voluntary basis. Finally, in 2000, Borsa Ital-
iana launched a new segment, the STAR 
(Segmento Titoli con Alti Requisiti) market, to 
enhance the visibility of small and medium 
old-economy enterprises committing to com-
ply with higher liquidity requirements and 
                                                                    
7  Listed Companies Corporate Governance 
Committee of Borsa Italiana, “Report and Self-
discipline Code”, 1999, available at 
www.borsaitalia.it. Similarly to the US and UK, the 
Corporate Governance Code requires the nomination 
of independent, non-executive directors, appointment 
of the audit, nominating and compensation 
committees, and the appointment of an Investor 
Relations Officer. 
more severe disclosure rules.  In spite of insti-
tutional changes, investor protection remains 
comparatively weak in Italy, even according 
to CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le 
Società e la Borsa), the Authority that governs 
Italian equity markets since 1974.8  For exam-
ple, almost all listed companies had issued a 
corporate governance report and made it 
available on the Internet by 2004, but only a 
minority had adopted at least one of the provi-
sions of the code.   
In essence, the 1990s were an important 
period of institutional change in Germany and 
Italy, both countries seeking to improve their 
“poor shareholder protection” status to 
improve the investment climate.  We argue 
that empirical studies are lacking to provide a 
clear understanding of the underlying 
relationships at work, and hope that this study 
will provide a benchmark for gauging future 
policy. 
2.2 Data 
Our empirical investigation uses two datasets, 
the first containing firms listed on the 
Frankfurt Börse and the second containing 
firms listed on the Italian exchange, Borsa 
Italiana.   
The German financial data came from the 
Bonn Database, which contains a complete set 
of all firms listed on the Frankfurt exchange.  
We excluded firms that were involved in 
                                                                    
8  In its Annual Report for the year 2000, 
CONSOB recommends that the newly introduced 
reform of company law (Law n. 58/1998) will “pave 
the way to strengthened protection of shareholders”. 
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mergers, bankruptcies, acquisitions, changes 
in legal status, double listing of consolidated 
and non-consolidated information for the 
same firm groups.  This data was matched 
with detailed information on the ownership 
identity, concentration, and bank relationship 
for 80 of the firms for which the information 
was publicly available.9   
One important contribution of our study 
comes from the fact that we collected our 
databases from original sources, allowing us 
to construct more precise and meaningful 
measures of firm-investor relationships than is 
normally possible with commercial data.  
Specifically we crafted variables measuring 
the degree of inside ownership/control as 
follows.  For Germany, because banking 
relationships are key components of the 
institutional environment for the firm, and a 
special case of inside ownership we needed to 
construct a bank influence variable.  This 
variable is a composite measure of bank 
influence on the firm relating to information 
we collected on the concentration of equity 
ownership in the firm, the use of proxy votes 
of the firm, and the degree of bank 
representation on the firms supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat). The construction of the 
variables indicating that the firm was 
controlled either by Insiders, Banks, or 
Institutions was done as follows. The Inside 
dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if either 
an individual or a family owns 25% of the 
firm or more, and no other owner owns more 
than 25%, in either 1991 or 1986.  The Bank 
variable indicates that a financial institution 
(bank or insurance company) either:  1) owns 
more than 25% of the firm and no other owns 
more than 25% of the firm, or 2) a bank owns 
50% of the firm (even if some other owns 
more than 25%), or 3) if the % of non-
employee representatives that are bankers on 
the supervisory board is 25% and the total 
proxy votes of banks at annual shareholder 
meetings is more than 10% or 4) the % of 
non-employee representatives that are bankers 
on the supervisory board is 10% and the total 
number of proxy votes executed by banks at 
annual shareholders meetings is 25% or more. 
                                                                    
9  For a complete description of these data see 
Chirinko and Elston (2006). 
This variable took the value of 0 otherwise, 
indicating minimal or no bank control over 
the firm activities.  Note that under German 
corporate law, a 25% share of voting rights is 
sufficient to block any major proposal at the 
shareholders’ meeting.  The Institute variable 
indicates that either an institution (either a 
financial firm or a non-financial firm or both) 
owns 25% of the firm or more, and no other 
owner owns more than 25%. Note that many 
of these measures are not mutually exclusive 
but represent alternative measures of insider 
control, and as such will be entered into the 
estimations separately to avoid 
multicollinearity in estimates. In the 
Appendix, Tables A1 and A2, we summarize 
the main characteristics of the German firms 
in our dataset. 
For Italy, we use annual firm-level data 
from the CERIS database that contains 
extensive information on 1850 Italian 
manufacturing firms over the period 1977-
2002.10 Our empirical investigation uses the 
sub-sample of 63 quoted firms that are still 
listed in the Milan Stock Exchange in 1995, 
when information about listed companies’ 
ownership structure first became publicly 
available. The earliest entries in the data are 
therefore in 1995 and the latest entries are in 
2000, in order to have at least 3 observations 
for firms going public in 2000. The panel 
comprises 334 firm-year observations for 63 
firms, of which 43 going public after 1995. 
Firms going public in the 1980s and in the 
1990s are recognized as different in many 
respects.11  While the former are typically 
                                                                    
10  The database, an unbalanced panel where firms 
have at least five consecutive observations, was 
constructed at CERIS-CNR using several sources. 
Balance-sheet and stock-exchange data are collected 
from two annual directories, Le Principali Società, 
and Indici e Dati published by Mediobanca, a large 
investment bank; information on corporate 
governance and ownership structure is derived from 
company reports, Borsa Italiana and CONSOB.  
Finally extensive information about the firms’ age, 
ultimate ownership, group affiliation, location and 
business activity was obtained from DUN’s 
Braadstreet and other directories. For a complete 
description of the dataset, see Benfratello et al., 2001.  
11  For differences in motivation to go public and 
post-IPO performance of these two groups of firms, 
see Carpenter and Rondi, 2006. 
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large, part of pyramidal groups where 
ownership and control are separated from 
ownership and less growth-oriented, the latter 
tend to be small or medium-sized, not 
affiliated to hierarchical groups (independent) 
and more motivated to growth around the IPO 
date. However, both kinds are ultimately 
family-owned, mature companies operating in 
manufacturing industries. 
Inside ownership is a key variable in this 
study. Ideally inside owners are shareholders 
that control decision-making (i.e. sitting on 
the board of directors and/or in the managerial 
board).12 For Italian firms, we could 
reconstruct year by year a continuous, time-
varying variable for inside ownership based 
on information about boards’ composition, 
“relevant” (i.e. > 2%) shareholdings and 
stockholders’ identity (Bollettino CONSOB, 
Special Issue, various years).  The detailed 
information on directors’ board composition 
we collected for this paper confirms that 
controlling families participate in top 
management, consistently with the definition 
of insider in the HHL model (see also LLSV, 
1999, and Bianchi, Bianco, Enriques, 2001).  
In Italy, the percentages of equity held by the 
controlling shareholder and by insiders are 
very close – 57.16 and 57.5%, on average in 
our sample – because the initial owner/ 
controlling shareholder (the entrepreneur 
manager who took the company public) 
usually sits on the board together with other 
members of the family. Most often, a 
«family», or an individual directly holds the 
controlling shareholding. Whenever it is held 
thorough a holding company, we could 
identify the ultimate owner in all but two 
cases. In the Appendix, Tables A3 and A4 
summarize the main characteristics of the 
Italian firms in our dataset. 
3. ESTIMATIONS AND RESULTS 
A key feature of the model is that investor 
protection may vary not only across countries, 
but also across firms. “Investor protection is 
                                                                    
12  HHL (2002) define it as the fraction of equity 
held by insiders, and use the “closely-held shares” 
variable from the Worldscope database for their 
cross-country analysis.  
anything that exogenously increases the cost 
of stealing from outsiders” (p. 8), widening 
the scope of our search of firm-level 
determinants of investor protection. For 
example, tangible assets, such as factories, 
plants and equipment are difficult to steal and 
provide a “built-in” degree of protection to 
outside shareholders. Or, the identity of 
minority shareholders, such as institutional 
investors or financial institutions, may 
influence investor protection to the extent that 
they carry more (or less) political clout with 
law enforcement agencies. Further, in 
countries with poor investor protection, 
insiders may have a hard time selling equity 
and may wish to signal that they intend to 
respect their financial contracts. They may do 
so by voluntarily disclosing sensitive 
information, improving quality of accounting 
standards, or complying with a self-
disciplining code of corporate governance, 
and so forth. 
Hypotheses and Estimation Results 
The empirical tests in this paper focus on two 
main hypotheses. First, we test if inside 
ownership depends on measures of investor 
protection by regressing inside ownership on 
variables that proxy the firm-specific, built-in 
degree of investor protection. Due to the 
different characteristics of the datasets, we 
adopt different estimation strategies to test 
this hypothesis. Second, we test the prediction 
of the model that the equilibrium level of 
inside ownership is positively related to the 
marginal return of capital, a relationship that 
reflects the additional idiosyncratic risk 
premium in the marginal cost of capital.  
We first present the empirical results for the 
Italian firms, in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 
reports coefficient estimates of the 
determinants of inside ownership 
concentration for our sample of 63 Italian 
manufacturing firms in Column A. Columns 
B and C report results for the sub-samples of 
mature listed firms (B) and firms that floated 
in the Nineties to explore potential differences 
in the behaviour of insiders in old and newly 
public companies. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of α, the equity holdings by 
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members of the firm’s board of directors. 
Column A includes several variables of “built-
in” investor protection: asset intangibility as 
measured by the sales to capital stock ratio 
(where the capital stock is reconstructed at 
replacement value based on a perpetual 
inventory method), a dummy variable 
returning if the firm is listed in the STAR 
(Segmento Titoli con Alti Requisiti – High 
Requirements Security Segment) branch of 
Borsa Italiana and a dummy variable which 
returns if the firm has a minority shareholding 
by an institutional investor (mutual or pension 
funds, or venture capital company). An 
additional dummy returns a one if the firm has 
complied with all norms by the Corporate 
Governance Self Discipline Code.  In columns 
B and C, the specifications account for the 
separate effect of the main norms in the Code, 
- namely if firms have independent directors, 
an auditing committee and an investor relation 
officer.13 Finally, we include a set of control 
variables, firm size (the log of real sales), a 
dummy returning if a group of the firm’s 
shareholders signed an agreement such as a 
voting pact, and the firm’s leverage. As 
highlighted by Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques 
(2001), in Italy, voting pacts and other 
agreements denoting a coalition of 
shareholders are viewed as devices to separate 
control from ownership as they allow insiders 
to control the firm with small equity stakes.14 
We include the leverage because if the firm’s 
manager/insider is reluctant to raise external 
equity funds, then debt is the only alternative 
resource to finance growth projects. So we 
expect that leverage enters with a positive 
coefficient (see for example, Mueller, 2005).   
In column (A) we find that the coefficient 
                                                                    
13  Construction of this variable required special 
attention for two reasons. First, companies are only 
recommended, not required complying with the code. 
Second, many companies provided only vague 
descriptions of their compliance to the code (e.g. not 
indicating the number or names of independent 
directors, or whether non-executive and independent 
directors in the required proportions were in the 
auditing committee). Only companies that applied all 
three norms literally were assigned a dummy value of 
1. 
14  Listed firms have to notify shareholders’ 
agreements, their content and duration to CONSOB.   
on the sales to capital ratio is positive but 
insignificant. The Institutional Investor 
dummy enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient, as expected. This suggests that 
having an institutional minority shareholder 
acts as a substitute for investor protection, 
thus allowing the insider to retain a smaller 
equity share. The coefficient on the STAR 
dummy is negative and not far from 
significant, suggesting that featuring a record 
of transparency in the public equity market 
also has a role in lowering ownership 
concentration.  Notably, only firms that 
IPO’ed in the Nineties list in the STAR 
segment.  The Corporate Governance dummy 
is the variable that we expect to best capture 
the built-in degree of investor protection. We 
find that the estimated coefficient is negative 
and significant, consistently with the model 
predictions.  
As for the control variables, both the 
dummy variable indicating “Shareholders’ 
Agreement” and firm’s size are not 
significant, whereas, the coefficient on firm’s 
leverage is positively signed as expected, but 
again not significantly different from zero.  
When we compare the results for old and 
newly public firms in columns B and C, we 
note several interesting differences. The first 
one is about the role of asset intangibility, as 
measured by the sales to capital ratio, which is 
included on the ground that intangibility of 
the assets (e.g. technological know-how, 
marketing capabilities, R&D activities) leads 
insiders to retain a larger fraction of the firm’s 
equity. Conversely, asset tangibility, i.e. assets 
that are difficult to divert or steal, would 
provide stronger built-in protection to outside 
investors, thus making it easier for the insiders 
to reduce their share in the firm. Our results 
show that this interpretation holds for newly 
public firms – where the coefficient is positive 
and nearly significant, but not for mature 
listed firms where the presence of intangible 
assets apparently is not an obstacle for the 
insider to reduce his stake in the company. 
One possible explanation for the negative 
sales-to-capital coefficient is that firms that 
have been in the public market for longer 
enjoy a “reputation” effect that releases the 
insiders from having to rely on firm-specific 
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investor protections. Given the structurally 
weak level of institutional protections this 
would reflect the underlying 
underdevelopment (lack of sophistication) of 
Italian equity markets. An alternative 
explanation is that insiders in long quoted 
firms do not require built-in protections 
because they may resort to alternative external 
sources to fund their projects.  This 
interpretation is apparently supported by the 
empirical result on the coefficient for leverage 
that is positive and strongly significant for 
mature firms and negatively insignificant for 
newly public firms. 
For this sub-sample only, firm size enters 
with a positive and nearly significant coeffi-
cient, indicating that inside ownership tend to 
be lower at smaller firms that went public in 
the Nineties. This is in contrast with HHL’s 
finding of a negative coefficient, which they 
explain by arguing that large size may ensure 
better protection to outside investors because 
of economies to scale to monitoring. Our 
result, however, appears more consistent with 
the Italian institutional context, where small 
and medium firms may be motivated to adopt 
monitoring devices by their need to raise 
external finance in a weakly protected 
environment.  
When we enter the corporate governance 
code’s dummies separately, we find that both 
the presence of Independent Directors and the 
existence of the Audit Committee display the 
expected negative effect on inside equity 
ownership. 
The second test we carry out focuses on the 
predicted positive relationship between the 
level of inside ownership (α) and the marginal 
return to capital (MPK). To implement 
equation [5] empirically, we construct 
industry-level estimates of θ by averaging 
over all firms i and years t in industry j, and 
by assuming r + δ = 0.18 for all industries. 
Thus, for industry j, θj is given by:  
 
θj = [(1/NT)ΣiΣt (PitYit/Kit)]-1 (r + δ ) [6] 
And, for firm i at time t, Πkit = θj (PitYit/Kit) 
is the measure of marginal return to capital. 
From the first-order condition for the 
capital stock in eq. [3], we obtain the 
following empirical model:  
 
MPKit+1 = r + δ + Γ + (γ – Γ)α it +uit   [7] 
 
These regressions produce estimates of (γ – 
Γ), which reflects the average additional risk 
premium for bearing idiosyncratic risk, above 
the systematic risk premium (Γ), which is 
absorbed in the constant term. 
In Table 2, we report the estimated 
coefficients from regressing the marginal 
profitability to capital on (lagged) inside 
ownership concentration for our sample of 
Italian firms. Both specifications account for 
firm specific effects and control for the 
endogeneity of inside ownership. The 
instrument set includes the once-lagged inside 
ownership and the variables we used when 
investigating the determinants of inside 
ownership in Table 1. Results in column A 
and B differ for the instrument sets as 
specified in the notes to the table. 
The empirical results for Italian firms 
support the positive relationship between the 
equity fraction owned by insiders and the 
marginal return to capital predicted by the 
first order condition that characterizes the 
optimal capital choice.  Columns A-B show 
that the coefficients on inside ownership are 
positive and significant, with estimated values 
of 0.1024 or of 0.096 depending on the 
instrument set, consistently with HHL’s 
model prediction that, under poor investor 
protection, the higher is the concentration of 
inside ownership, the higher is the implied 
cost of capital. 
Using the estimated coefficients in Table 2, 
we can calculate the quantitative importance 
of cost of capital distortions for the firm size, 
i.e. the extent to which weak governance is an 
obstacle to efficient accumulation of capital 
(see Table A5). These also depend on the 
elasticity of the capital stock to the marginal 
cost of capital.15 Given our estimates of (γ – Γ) 
                                                                    
15  In the Appendix, Table A7 reports the solutions 
for the equilibrium values of marginal profit to 
capital and the associated capital stock assuming the 
estimated coefficients and sample values of inside 
ownership. We use the first-order condition as from 
eq. [7], assuming a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with constant returns to scale and a 
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= 0.1024 (0.096 in column B), which 
measures the cost of capital premium for 
idiosyncratic risk under weak investor 
protection, a firm where the insider typically 
holds 50.9% of the equity (the 25th percentile 
in our sample of Italian firms) is found to 
accumulate only about one third of the capital 
of a firm where the insider’s stake is 10%. We 
can conclude that the magnitude of the 
underinvestment due to highly concentrated 
ownership and poor shareholders’ protection 
in Italy is found to be quite important.    
We now turn to our sample of German 
firms, where the empirical approach has to 
adjust to account for the presence of banks as 
major players in German capital and corporate 
control market. Instead of investigating the 
determinants of the insider’s equity share, we 
therefore investigate what determines whether 
the insider is a family, a bank or an institution, 
with dichotomous dependent variables to 
represent the identity of the insider.  Table 3 
reports the results of the logit model in which 
the probability that the firm is dominated by 
banks (column A), an institution (B) or a 
controlling family or individual (C), or, is a 
linear and function of firm-specific investor 
protections. The set of explanatory variables 
includes firm size (the logarithm of total 
assets), R&D intensity measured as the ratio 
of intangible to tangible assets of the firm, 
leverage as measured by the ratio of total debt 
to the sum of debt and equity, and time and 
industry dummies.  
Our results show that there is a positive 
relationship between firm size and Bank 
influence as indicated by positive and 
statistically significant coefficients in 
estimations A; a negative relationship 
between firm size and Institutional ownership, 
but no relationship between firm size and 
Family insiders. There are several possible 
explanations, but we interpret this as 
indicating that investors in larger firms may 
                                                                                                 
downward sloping demand curve for output. So (1- 
η)AK-η = r + δ + Γ + (γ – Γ)α it is the starting  point. 
To derive the impact of changes in investor 
protection and ownership concentration numerically, 
we adopt the parameter values for η, δ,  r, and Γ used 
by HHL (2002) which are, respectively, 0.2, 0.08, 
0.10 and 0.0.  
seek banks as an alternative insider (or in 
effect bank influence) as a solution to control 
the expropriation of firm assets –thus 
obtaining better protection. Conversely, the 
negative coefficient in column (B) seems to 
confirm that institutional ownership is 
perceived as a substitute for shareholders’ 
protection particularly to investors in small 
firms.  The lack of significance of the size 
variable in C is interesting, possibly indicating 
that for family-controlled firms there is 
neither better nor worse investor protection no 
matter what the firm size.  
The coefficient on R&D (the ratio of 
intangible to tangible assets) is economically 
and statistically significant and positive for 
estimations A and B.  If intangible assets 
(ideas vs. computers) are easier to “steal” or 
expropriate, then this help explain why R&D 
is such a strong and positive indicator of bank 
and institutional influence.  If R&D is 
endogenous, which it surely is to some 
degree, another interpretation is that firms 
with bank influence have better investor 
protection and would then also have an easier 
time financing R&D, in which case like bank 
influence would be an endogenous proxy for 
good investor protection.  The negative and 
significant sign on R&D for family insiders in 
column C is consistent with the notion that 
this variable captures idiosyncratic risk which 
is high in this case and is an endogenous 
indicator of weak investor protection.  
Leverage enters positively and significantly 
only for firms dominated by institutions, 
which indicates that these firms find it 
relatively easy to raise external funds 
alternative to equity to finance their projects. 
In contrast neither family-controlled nor bank-
influenced firms appear to be able to do so. 
Even though this may appear counterintuitive 
for firms controlled by banks, our result is 
consistent with previous studies, such as      
Chirinko and Elston (2006) which find that 
bank influenced firms in Germany do not 
have greater debt levels nor lower cost of 
financing than independent firms.     
In Table 4, we estimate the marginal 
product of capital as a proxy for the cost of 
capital as a function of Bank, Institute and 
Family inside ownership. We add firm size as 
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a control variable.  The negative significant 
sign on size in all specifications indicates that, 
regardless of the insider’s identity, larger 
firms have a smaller marginal cost of capital, 
which is to be expected due to better 
information sharing with creditors and better 
access to capital markets.  When we turn to 
the relationship between MPK and type of 
ownership we find that being dominated by an 
Institution increases the cost of capital 
(column B), even when firm size is accounted 
for.  A likely explanation for this result is that 
the relationship spuriously captures the 
leverage effects (see the results in Table 3), 
which are possible if the debt markets are not 
frictionless and insiders bear the 
consequences of a borrowing rate increasing 
in the debt to asset ratio.  However the 
coefficient on Family (column C) is negative 
and significant while the one on Bank 
(column A) is insignificant. These findings 
generally do not support the prediction that 
family inside ownership (or bank influence) 
increases the cost of capital, nor are consistent 
with an institutional environment that is weak 
in shareholder protection, particularly when 
compared to the Italian data results.   
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we empirically investigate the 
impact of investor protection on the cost of 
capital in Europe, where investor protection 
can be characterized according to HHL (2002) 
as “those features of the legal, institutional, 
and regulatory environment – and 
characteristics of firms or projects – that 
facilitate financial contracting between inside 
owners (managers) and outside investors”.  To 
date, research indicates the significance of 
these effects overall and the importance of 
examining differences between countries, but 
very few empirical studies have emerged to 
link micro-firm financial behaviour to the 
institutional environment.  
Our findings suggest that for Italy, 
voluntary compliance with corporate 
governance norms as well as tighter liquidity 
and disclosure rules have a negative impact on 
the concentration of inside ownership of the 
firm.  The presence of institutional minority 
investment is also a negative determinant of 
inside ownership, suggesting that the presence 
of institutional investors may serve as a signal 
of better protection.  We interpret these 
variables as proxies of firm specific “built-in” 
investor protections.  Our results confirm that 
investor protection has an important cross-
firm dimension in addition to the more 
familiar cross-country dimension, as 
suggested by HHL’s approach.  Furthermore, 
for Italian firms, we find that the cross-firm 
dimension of investor protection changes with 
length of the period on the stock market.  
Specifically, asset intangibility is a positive 
determinant of the insider’s stake for newly 
public firms; but it is not for companies that 
have been quoted on the exchange for longer 
periods of time. Mature firms apparently 
compensate for the lack of outside equity by 
increasing debt, but firms that went public in 
the 1990s do not.   
In Germany, we find an environment with 
both higher investor protection and lower 
concentrated ownership than Italy, but no 
evidence of an external financing premium.   
Our results suggest that investors in large 
firms may seek inside bank influence as a 
means of increasing outside minority 
shareholder protection. Allowing for 
endogeneity in our interpretation of bank 
influence, these results also suggest that bank 
influence may to some degree, also serve as a 
signal of better protection to investors. In 
Germany, a firm’s R&D intensity has a 
strongly positive impact on the probability 
that the firm would have bank influence, but 
not on its propensity to have concentrated 
insider ownership otherwise, also indicative 
that firms with bank influence may provide 
better investor protection and/or have an 
easier time financing R&D projects. 
In both countries, asset intangibility is a 
positive determinant of concentrated inside 
ownership. We interpret this as an indication 
that R&D intensive firms (which have higher 
percentages of intangible assets) have a harder 
time obtaining equity capital (thus diluting 
capital structure) because of the inherent 
asymmetrical information problems 
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associated with high technology firms. 
Finally, our results for German firms 
suggest that bank influence has little impact 
the firm’s marginal cost of capital, consistent 
with earlier findings on the relatively weak 
influence of banks on firm capital structure.  
In contrast, our evidence for Italy shows that 
the higher the concentration of inside 
ownership, the higher is the implied cost of 
capital, thus confirming the link between 
investor protection, ownership structure and 
the cost of capital. This suggests that the 
magnitude of the distortions from the first-
best level of capital stock may be large in 
countries with poor investor protection like 
Italy, concurring to explain underinvestment 
and slow growth.  
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TABLE 1 
DETERMINANTS OF INSIDE OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION  
ITALIAN FIRMS 
Dependent Variable: Log α 
Firm-Level Characteristics (A) 
(B) 
Mature Listed 
Firms 
(C) 
Firms IPOing in the 
90s 
Sales / Capital 0.003 -0.061* 0.005 
 (0.840) (-1.742) (1.491) 
STAR Segment - 0.306 - 0.011 
 (-1.211) - (0.322) 
Institutional Investors -0.060** -0.087*** -0.003 
 (-1.985) (-2.689) (-0.139) 
Corporate Governance Code -0.091** - - 
 (-2.279) - - 
Independent Directors - -0.181*** -0.075* 
 - (-2.879) (-1.654) 
Audit Committee - -0.078       -0.282*** 
 - (-1.208) (-3.135) 
Investor Relation Officer - 0.034  0.171* 
 - (1.029) (1.763) 
Shareholders’ Agreement 0.131 0.045 0.039 
 (1.239) (0.744) (0.762) 
Leverage 0.164 0.387** -0.030 
 (1.054) (2.077) (-0226) 
Log (Sales) 0.026 0.003 0.116 
 (0.501) (0.006) (1.575) 
    
Adj-R2 0.723 0.830 0.688 
N. Obs.  334 147 187 
N. Firms 63 20 43 
Notes: LSDV estimates. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level or less. 
**    Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level. 
*      Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent. 
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TABLE 2 
ESTIMATES OF THE FIRST-ORDER CONDITION FOR THE CAPITAL STOCK  
ITALIAN FIRMS 
Dependent Variable:  MPK 
 
(A) 
I. V. 
(B) 
I. V. 
Inside Ownershipt     0.1024**      0.096*** 
 (2.357) (3.009) 
   
   
Firm Dummies Yes Yes 
   
   
   
N. obs.  271 271 
N. Firms 63 63 
Sample period  1996-2002 1996-2002 
Notes: 2SLS estimation performed using Limdep.  t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
*** Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level or less. 
**    Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level. 
* Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent. 
Instruments in Col. (A): Insider (-1), Sales/Capital, Inst. Investors, CorpGov. Code 
Instruments in Col. (B): Insider (-1), Log (Sales), Sales/Capital, Inst. Investors, CorpGov. Code. 
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TABLE 3  
LOGIT ANALYSIS OF THE PROBABILITY OF BANK / INSTITUTION / FAMILY OWNERSHIP  
GERMAN FIRMS 
Bank Institute  Family 
Dependent Variable 
(A) (B) (C) 
Log (Total Assets) 1.093*** -0.829*** -0.178 
 (4.729) (-3.163) (-1.187) 
R&D (1) 9.325*** 34.763*** -14.424*** 
 (2.546) (3.003) (-2.905) 
Leverage -1.226 4.784*** -1.298 
 (-1.186) (3.164) (-1.518) 
    
    
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
χ2 239.1 [20] 312.0 [20] 77.1 [20] 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCP 83.5% 90.2% 80.7% 
N. Firms  43 43 43 
N. Obs. 357 (2) 357 357 
 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses 
Bank influence uses data on bank equity ownership, proxy votes used by bank, and supervisory board 
representation. Family ownership is the concentration of family or individual ownership. Institute indicates 
ownership by financial or non-financial institutions. 
 
(1) R&D= (Intangible Assets / Tangible Assets) 
(2) Excluding Intangible / Tangible > 1 and observations for which debt was not available  
 
*** Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level or less. 
**    Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level. 
* Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent. 
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TABLE 4  
ESTIMATES OF THE FIRST-ORDER CONDITION FOR THE CAPITAL STOCK 
GERMAN FIRMS 
MPK 
Dependent Variable 
(A) (B) (C) 
Bank Influence -0.010 - - 
 (-0.347) - - 
Institution Inside Ownership - 0.095*** - 
 - (3.978) - 
Family Inside Ownership - - -0.049** 
 - - (-2.276) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.058*** -0.050*** -0.057*** 
 (-4.351) (-4.044) (-4.644) 
    
    
    
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Adj-R2 0.20 0.22 0.21 
N. Firms  45 45 45 
N. Obs. 312(1) 312 312 
 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity.  t-statistics in parentheses. 
Bank influence uses data on bank equity ownership, proxy votes used by bank, and supervisory board representation. 
Family ownership is the concentration of family or individual ownership. Institute indicates ownership by financial or 
non-financial institutions. 
(1) Excluding MPK < 0.03 and MPK > 2 
 
*** Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level or less. 
**    Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level. 
* Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1 – GERMAN SAMPLE: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY INDUSTRY UPON ENTRY 
(Means) 
 Industries N. Firms 
Inside-
Controlled 
Firms 
Firms with 
Bank  
Shareholding 
Others  
1 Mineral Products, Paper, Oil, Forestry   5 1   0 4 
2 Chemical and Rubber   3 0   3 0 
3 Iron, Steel, Machinery & Equipment 18 6 11 1 
4 Electronics, Optics, Computers   6 1   1 4 
5 Transport Equipment    3 1   1 1 
6 Food, Drink, & Tobacco   4 1   0 3 
7 Textiles, Leather   0 - - - 
8 Utilities and Power    6 0   3 3 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A2 – GERMAN SAMPLE: DEFINITIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS  
FOR FIRM-LEVEL VARIABLES  
(Means and percentiles, 1986-1991) 
 Variable Mean Stdev. 25th Perc. 50th Perc. 75th Perc. 
1 Bank inside ownership 0.39 0.489 0.00 0.00 1.00 
2 Institute inside ownership 0.39 0.489 0.00 0.00 1.00 
3 Family inside ownership 0.22 0.415 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 Log (Assets) 21.84 1.10 21.01 22.03 22.58 
5 R&D (asset intangibility) 0.04 0.08 0.003 0.012 0.039 
6 MPK 0.21 1.20 0.10 0.16 0.27 
7 Book leverage 0.51 0.18 0.36 0.52 0.64 
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TABLE A3 – ITALIAN SAMPLE:  FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY INDUSTRY UPON ENTRY 
(Means) 
 Industries N. Firms 
Inside 
 equity 
ownership
STAR 
 segment 
Institution
al 
 Investor 
Sharehold
ers’ 
Agreement 
Corporate 
Governance Lev 
1 Non metallic mineral products 5 60.07 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 43.84 
2 Chemical rubber and plastics 8 62.40 0.38 0.50 0.38 0.38 23.00 
3 Machinery and Equipment 10 52.54 0.30 0.80 0.50 0.20 38.13 
4 Electrical machinery. TLC and electronics  17 60.67 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.29 29.33 
5 Transport Equipment 5 53.12 0.40 0.80 0.20 0.80 41.02 
6 Food and Drinks 4 52.68 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.50 41.08 
7 Textile and Clothing  12 58.75 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.33 35.85 
8 Print Publishing 2 59.78 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 43.28 
 
 
 
TABLE A4 – ITALIAN SAMPLE: DEFINITIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FIRM-LEVEL 
VARIABLES  
(Group means and percentiles, 1995-2002) 
 Variable Mean Stdev. 25th Perc. 50th Perc. 75th Perc. 
1 Inside Equity Ownership  0.575 0.118 0.509 0.590 0.662 
2 Log (Sales) 11.8691 1.0629 11.076 11.726 12.541 
3 Sales/Capital 3.135 5.281 1.494 1.920 3.200 
4 MPK 0.175 0.430 0.081 0.112 0.156 
5 Book leverage 0.366 0.215 0.180 0.351 0.518 
6 Corporate Govern. Code 0.142 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.250 
7 Star Segment 0.339 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 
8 Institutional Investors 0.469 0.409 0.000 0.429 1.000 
 
 
 
TABLE A5 – QUANTITATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL STOCK  
DISTORTIONS FOR ITALY 
γ – Γ 
α 
Πk K 
0.000 0.180 100 
0.100 0.190 75.83 
0.300 0.211 45.48 
0.509 0.232 28.05 
0.575 0.239 24.29 
0.662 0.248 20.23 
 
Notes: Calculations based on observed equity ownership of Italian 
 insiders and estimated values of the idiosyncratic  risk premium, γ – Γ.  
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